毕业论文：公平与效率的抉择—基于中国上市公司的实证研究.docVIP

股权制衡：公平与效率的抉择—基于中国上市公司的实证研究 张光荣 曾勇 电子科技大学管理学院 610054 Check-and-balance Ownership Structure, A Trade-off Between Fairness and Efficiency: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies ZHANG Guang-rong， ZENG Yong School of Management of UESTC, 摘要：* 本研究得到教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”项目（教技司[2005]2号）资助。在存在控制性大股东的公司中，控股股东可能利用其对公司的控制权侵占公司资源，损害小股东利益。其他大股东的进入有助于形成制衡的股权结构，减少控股股东的侵占行为，但其负面影响是股东之间的互相牵制影响决策效率。本文首先分析了股权制衡可能对公司带来 * 本研究得到教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”项目（教技司[2005]2号）资助。 关键词：股权制衡，公司治理，大股东侵占，经营绩效 Abstract: Controlling shareholders may expropriate corporate resources and harm minority shareholders’ benefit by taking advantage of their control rights in companies with controlling shareholders. The entrance of other blockholders can form check-and-balance ownership structure, which can restrict controlling shareholders’ expropriation. But on the other hand, the entrance of other blockholders bring about negative influence on the efficiency of the company’s management decision because of restricting one another among major shareholders. This paper firstly analyzes the advantageous and disadvantageous effects of the check-and-balance ownership structure, and then empirically investigates these two kinds of effects based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2001 to 2004. The empirical results show that, the check-and-balance ownership structure can restrict expropriation, thus protect the benefits of minority shareholders. However, the presence of outside blockholders can have the significant negative influences on company’s operating performance, especially in the state-owned companies and well-performed companies. Therefore, the optimal ownership structure may be a trade-off between these two effects of enhancing fairness and losing efficiency that are brought by outside blockholders. Key words: Check-and-balance ownership structure, Corporate governance, Expropriation, Operating performance 1 引言 大股东与小股东之间的利益冲突问题是近年来公司治理研究的重要领域。上世纪九十年代以来，大量的研究表明，现代公司的股权结构并不普遍表现为Berle和Means（1932）[1]所描述的那样极为分